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Abstract 
This article seeks to explain how and why the EU’s relatively frequent existential crises – 
complete with ‘end of Europe’ rhetoric – ultimately result in new areas of consensus regarding 
the EU’s integration project.  During the course of these existential crises, member states are able 
to release underlying societal tensions that might have stood as stumbling blocks to further 
consensus, and thus achieve a sense of ‘catharsis,’ as evidenced by convergence in attitudes.  To 
illustrate this process, the article examines the case of the Eurozone crisis, and describes how 
North-South tensions that pre-dated this crisis period were openly aired during the height of the 
crisis, and created a window of opportunity for leaders to agree to a number of far-reaching 
policies in the economic and financial area. 
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Introduction 
The evolving European order, which centers on the process of European Union (EU) 
integration, is characterized by both incremental change and critical junctures of crisis.  This 
article focuses on the latter, and aims to provide an agenda for future research into European 
crises.  Even a casual look at the history of the EU since its inception in 1957 shows that at 
numerous periods through its development, the EU (or EEC/EC in its previous incarnations) has 
been portrayed as being in severe crisis, even on the verge of dissolution.  I examine why these 
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predictions, particularly those of existential threat (episodes in which it seems the “end of 
Europe” is at hand), have continually been proven false.  This article seeks to contribute to an 
overarching proposition that existential crises repeatedly give European leaders a window of 
opportunity for consensual decision-making, which enables further shaping of European order.1   
A widely accepted definition of crisis is ‘an extraordinary moment when the existence 
and viability of the political order are called into question’ (Ikenberry 2008:3).  An existential 
crisis is a more intense version of this in which there is a palpable perception that an actor’s very 
survival or fundamental character is at stake.  To explain the puzzle of EU resilience in the face 
of crises, I focus on narratives – defined as how Europeans talk about crises – and how these 
narratives feed into crisis resolution (Hay 1999: 317-44).  I argue that EU crises provide the 
means to release tensions that would otherwise remain under the surface, and likely impede 
consensus in certain policy areas.  This article focuses on the role of catharsis – defined as a 
release of tensions that enables movement past sources of stress and the attainment of new 
insights.  At the societal level, these tensions often have to do with differences in identity, 
political culture, and attitudes towards the EU.  At the elite, political level, they often have to 
with national interest, geopolitics, and attitudes toward other countries.  Crises give Europeans at 
both levels an opportunity to debate issues in ways that would otherwise be considered 
confrontational.  In so doing, they are able to overcome some of these tensions and achieve a 
sense of catharsis, which is linked to the creation of new avenues for consensus on policy 
options. 
This article proceeds as follows.  The first section briefly reviews a few select aspects of 
the vast literature on crisis resolution to shed light on how this process often works, and what 
consequences crises bring.  I suggest that the concept of catharsis fills a gap in our understanding 
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of crisis resolution, and is a valuable way to shed light on this process in the European context.  
The second section examines the case of the 2010-12 Eurozone crisis.  The dominant narrative 
during this crisis largely centered on division between northern and southern European member 
states,2 tensions that pre-dated the crisis and arguably stood as obstacles to further economic 
integration.  Through an examination of media coverage and opinion polls during the period, I 
argue that as the existential crisis dissipated there was convergence in North-South attitudes 
about EU integration, indicating that catharsis has taken place.3 
 
Understanding Crisis Resolution 
Observers often refer casually to the notion that crises create opportunities, but there is 
almost no theorizing on how this repeatedly occurs in the context of the EU.  After all, in the 
literature on how crises bring about political change, it is fully within the realm of possibility that 
institutional structures like the EU may be dismantled to make room for new forms of 
organization.  For example, the systemic/structural perspective to understanding crises argues 
that ‘destabilizing forces’ in the international system disturb routine patterns, undermine 
institutions, and ultimately threaten the nature of the existing structure (Young 1968:6-15).  
While acknowledging the broad literature on the processes by which crises bring about political 
change, I focus here on one aspect of this – catharsis – which I suggest is crucial in explaining 
the outcome of EU resilience, as opposed to destruction, in the face of crises. 
The more specific literature on crisis resolution is valuable in mapping out the various 
possibilities of how actors react to and resolve crises.  Situating the EU’s frequent existential 
crises in this theoretical roadmap also shows that there is a gap in our understanding of how 
crisis resolution works in the EU context.  While it would be impossible to fully outline this 
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wide-ranging literature here, for the purposes of this article, I synthesize its general approach into 
roughly three phases of crisis resolution – (1) the broadening of policy choices, (2) the elevated 
power of elites to decide, and (3) the potential outcomes4 – and subsequently explain how the 
concept of catharsis helps to fill this gap when it comes to explaining the crisis pattern in Europe. 
 
The Broadening of Policy Choices 
 In the first stage of crisis resolution, the range of possible actions in response to a crisis 
opens up.  Leaders craft their own ideas of what should be done, experts and epistemic 
communities put forward a variety of policy solutions, and the public also often weighs in.  As 
Peter Haas (2001: 11581) argues, ‘New ideas will be solicited and selected only after crises, for 
crises will alert politicians to the need for action and will seek to gather information about their 
interests and options.’  While this statement is somewhat of an overstatement – new ideas 
arguably matter at all times – crises do bring with them uncertainty precisely because they 
enable a much larger range of possible actions than during non-crisis periods.  Similarly, 
Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Kelemen (2007: 343) write that critical junctures have two main 
outcomes: ‘the range of plausible choices open to powerful political actors expands substantially 
and the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of interest are potentially much more 
momentous.’  In addition, at the societal level there is often a sense of unity in the wake of a 
crisis.  Thomas Drabek and David McEntire (2003: 99) point to two immediate crisis effects that 
are common: ‘individuals and groups typically become more cohesive and unified during 
situations of collective stress,’ and ‘new behaviors and organizations appear after disaster.’  
When the citizenry is more unified in its response, public input can have a stronger than usual 
contribution to broadening the range of possible choices in response to crises. 
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The Elevated Power of Elites to Decide 
 In the second stage, it becomes clear that leaders – as opposed to other actors – have the 
primary responsibility to decide what action to take.  The role of elites is greater than in non-
crisis periods as the public relies on them to make important choices and to find the best way out 
of the crisis (Boin et al. 2005: 1).  Even though leaders often gain more decision-making power 
and have a wider-range of options during times of crisis, resolving crises is easier said than done.  
Indeed, organizational theory finds that crises are often exacerbated because systems disruptions 
make it difficult for organizational managers to perform well.  In effect, once the impact of the 
crisis is felt, decision makers can make it worse if they do not deal with it effectively.  Matthew 
Seeger et al. (2003: 9) write, ‘Organizational members, crisis stake holders, and the public often 
experience intense emotional arousal, stress, fear, anxiety, and apprehension, which may 
compromise their ability to make effective decisions.’  Thus, much is at stake in the context of 
crisis.  If leaders appear to be ineffective then negative perceptions about the crisis could 
intensify, creating a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy dynamic.  Leaders can very quickly lose 
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, and along with them, so could the governments they 
represent (Boin 2004: 166).  
 At the same time, many scholars recognize the opportunity inherent in the process of 
crisis resolution.  Some refer explicitly to a kind of ‘silver lining effect’ (Seeger 2003: 6; Meyers 
1986).  Crises require change to be overcome, and what decision-makers do with this opening 
provides the potential to make things better in some way.  Several scholars make reference to the 
opportunity that has followed various crises in the European context.  Anand Menon argues that 
the Iraq crisis served to make competing preferences explicit, enabling the achievement of more 
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security cooperation (Menon 2004: 631--48).  Daniel Keohane and Steven Everts (2003: 168) 
argue that the constitutional crisis created an opportunity for self-definition, leading to key 
institutional reform. Neil Fligstein (2001: 266) argues that the integration crisis of the 1980s 
enabled skilled strategic actors to build new political coalitions and push for the establishment of 
the Single Market.  And Thomas Risse (2010) suggests that EU crises often contribute to making 
the European public sphere more robust through politicizing the citizenry around certain issues.  
These studies and others all support the argument that various crises have enabled Europeans to 
clarify the issues at stake and make agreement a clear priority (Crowe 2003: 533--46; Gamble 
2006: 34--49; Lewis 2009: 432--450).  Moreover, they argue that such agreement may not have 
otherwise been found in the absence of crisis. 
 
Crisis Resolution Outcomes 
In the third stage, leaders with decision-making authority take action, and the outcome of 
a crisis becomes apparent.  Most arguments about crisis resolution naturally prioritize the role of 
elites or leaders in finding ways out of crises, but they differ in terms of what elites choose to do.  
One possibility is that leaders will take advantage of the crisis to quickly get policies 
implemented that would otherwise not survive democratic procedures.  In other words, the 
argument is that they strategically use crises for political ends, such as for increasing state power 
or furthering EU integration (Sala 2010).  Naomi Klein (2011) introduces the idea of the shock 
doctrine to refer to the sinister ways in which leaders get away with pushing through unpopular 
policies while the public is distracted by a crisis.  Similarly, Carl Schmitt (1922/2004: 5) argues 
that sovereign decision makers may actually create crises to justify certain political actions.  
According to this view, when a sovereign defines a crisis as such, he can then disregard the 
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natural principles and laws that normally bind his actions and protect the interests of the people 
(Schmitt 1922/2004: 8).  Andrew Neal (2009:1) also argues that liberal states can act illiberally 
when statesmen take advantage of the exceptionalism of crises to change the existing order.  
Indeed, this can become a dangerous, slippery slope towards dictatorship, as has occurred at 
numerous times through history from Julius Caesar to Napoleon to Hitler. 
Another possibility, however, is closer to what happens in the European context.  Leaders 
could respond to crises through rebuilding and transforming institutions, creating a better-
functioning institutional and normative environment.  Indeed, some organizational theorists 
argue that crises are actually an inherent and natural part of organizational development.  
Organizations need change and improvement, and crises provide that opportunity (Seeger 2003: 
232).  As Gene Rochlin (1996: 55--59) argues, the human errors that crises bring to light allow 
the creation of better-designed and maintained organizations.  The organizational approach tends 
to see crises as being subject to standard operating procedures.  Built in to the set-up of 
institutions is the ability to go into ‘crisis mode’ when something goes wrong.  These events are 
thus planned for in advance.  Richard Rosecrance (1963), for example, suggests that systems that 
survive repeated crises have a strong variety of regulatory mechanisms in place.  Thus, if 
institutions already have built-in safeguards and mechanisms for handling crises, leaders are 
more likely to make adjustments to the system in place rather than trying to transform the 
existing order entirely. 
In cases of international crises that seemingly threaten cooperation or integration among 
states, leaders are often even less constrained because they are expected to prioritize the 
sovereignty and well-being of their own territory and citizens.  Thus, they could (1) roll back, (2) 
freeze, or (3) push forward cooperation and integration.  Leaders might choose to roll back 
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cooperation if they interpret a crisis as a signal that their cooperative arrangement no longer 
works.  For example, some experts argue that the Eurozone crisis meant that the Euro was 
doomed and should be dropped in favor of national currencies.  Leaders might alternatively 
choose to freeze the level of cooperation that has already been achieved if they interpret a crisis 
as a signal that pushing for more cooperation would be dangerous.  For example, in the 2003 Iraq 
crisis for the EU, when there was an initial failure to achieve a common stance and the crisis 
narrative played up deep East-West (or so-called old-new) divisions, some elites argued that any 
enhancement of CFSP would be impossible, and that Europeans were not capable of improving 
their approach to foreign policy.  Finally, another reaction to a crisis could be for leaders to push 
forward with more integration in response to crises.  In theory, this would seem to be the least 
likely outcome because in an international system based on state sovereignty, we might expect 
leaders to take a ‘safer’ route that restores sovereignty, in order to avoid future crises and to 
reduce the vulnerability that comes with interdependence (Gilpin 1975: 37--60).  These various 
routes to crisis resolution present a puzzle: In the case of the EU, why have crises served as 
opportunities to find new areas of consensus among member states?   
 
Catharsis 
Organizations, leaders, and elites are important actors in resolving crises, but there are 
also broader societal processes at work that must be considered to explain EU resilience in the 
face of perceived existential threat.  I argue that the concept of societal catharsis fills an 
important gap in the existing literature on crisis resolution.  The field of psychology, drawing on 
Greek drama, defines catharsis as a kind of Freudian-style process in which individuals seek to 
more fully recognize and express emotions about past events that they typically repress as a 
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result of a personal crisis.  It can be a painful experience, but in releasing these tensions, they are 
able to move beyond sources of psychological stress.  At the leadership level, catharsis often 
accompanies intense pressure to resolve the crisis, recognition of disjunctures in previous 
reasoning or preferences, and/or the realization that past behavior was flawed.  The result is often 
new and sudden insight, a more positive attitude about oneself, and the end of destructive or 
counter-productive behavior that deviates from the norm.  This can also happen at the group 
level, although I use the concept here as a kind of analogy for what happens in European society 
more generally during EU existential crises (Hodgskin 1941: 184--192). 
As EU crises build and reach their height, if catharsis is at work we should expect 
societal actors – both at the public and elite levels – to craft narratives around their dominant pre-
crisis tensions.  It is in the very urgency of this emotional, crisis atmosphere that the impetus 
towards crisis resolution takes place.  If pre-existing tensions shape the terms of a crisis’s 
dominant narrative, turning these episodes into opportunities to speak frankly, then Europeans 
are more likely to overcome certain differences that would have otherwise served as obstacles to 
reaching consensus about EU policy.  Tensions are released that would otherwise remain under 
the surface.  Thus, we should expect to find evidence of convergence in societal attitudes as 
crises wind down.   
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Figure 1: Framework of Analysis 
 
Of course, these tensions rarely go away entirely – North-South tensions clearly persist years 
after the height of existential crisis.  But the build-up of pressure can be released during a crisis, 
making these tensions less perceptible afterwards, and opening up new pathways for consensus.  
At the elite level, I hypothesize that the causal mechanism behind this is the ability to act beyond 
strict national interest, and instead to be seen as contributing to a solution.  At the societal level, 
the causal mechanism could involve rediscovery and reaffirmation that the existence of the EU is 
a good thing, and should be preserved. 
 
The Eurozone Crisis 
The case of the 2010-12 Eurozone crisis is valuable in illustrating this catharsis 
dimension of crisis resolution in Europe.5  In this case study, I first identify the pre-existing 
societal tensions of the time.  Second, I compare these pre-existing tensions to societal narratives 
Pre-crisis: 
growing 
societal 
tensions
Crisis build-up: 
potential 
triggers are 
numerous, 
media plays a 
strong role
Crisis height: 
airing of pre-
existing 
tensions, 
socially 
constructed 
crisis narrative
Crisis 
resolution: 
catharsis & elite 
consensus 
decision-
making
End of 
existential 
crisis: 
aftermath & 
recovery, new 
social 
convergence
 11 
during the crisis.  The expectation is that if European society airs these tensions, then some 
degree of catharsis is achieved.  Catharsis is not an easy process to observe empirically, but I 
consider media coverage during the crisis as an indicator of the main crisis narrative, as well as 
Eurobarometer polls to establish the change in attitudes before and after the crisis.  I also assess 
the extent to which leaders find new areas of consensus as they seek to resolve the crisis.  
Although I briefly visit some aspects of the origins and build-up of this crisis, the main purpose 
of this case study is to examine any evidence that catharsis took place.  
 
Pre-Existing Tensions 
EU member states have spent many decades crafting an ‘ever closer union,’ particularly 
in the economic and monetary area.  However, they have followed a strategy of gradualism, 
creating close targets, and maintaining flexibility in achieving them (Dinan 2003).  This strategy 
had worked well for some time, especially because there was little reason for an urgent pace of 
integration, and the European economy was generally healthy, maintaining steady growth until 
the worldwide economic contraction in 2009 (Eurostat).  EU leaders naturally favored this 
gradualist approach because they knew that there were certain obstacles in the way of completing 
the goal of a truly single market, and that they would have to be dismantled piecemeal.   
In the lead-up to the Eurozone crisis, North-South tensions had emerged as an increasing 
source of concern.6  These tensions had been arguably present since the early years of economic 
integration, but they intensified in 2008.  There were several reasons for this.  First, the global 
economic crisis put the entire European economy on shakier ground.  Second, there was 
increasing evidence that the South was not being as fiscally conservative as the North (Verney 
2009: 2), and that southern member states strongly favored higher subsidies and less regulation 
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for producers (Thomson 2009).  Third, there was a growing sense of divide between those EU 
countries that had adopted the Euro and those northern countries (UK, Sweden, and Denmark) 
that had not.  British Prime Minister David Cameron emphasized this aspect with his rhetoric 
about preventing the Eurozone from controlling the destiny of the EU (Milliband 2011).  Fourth, 
the rise of German economic power alongside growing German economic leadership (Dees 
2005) raised concerns and insecurity in other member states (Kulish 2010).  Finally, with the 
tightening of domestic budgets and enlargement of EU membership, the division between net 
contributors and net detractors to the EU budget became more contentious (Zimmer et al., 2005).  
Thus, before the onset of the Eurozone crisis, these tensions stood as obstacles to major 
innovations in the economic and financial spheres. 
 
Crisis Narrative 
 The origins of the Eurozone crisis were not a consequence of these underlying tensions 
stemming from differences in economic culture.  Dozens of articles, books, and opinion pieces 
have been published about the build-up, intensification, and contagion effect of the Eurozone 
crisis.  One argument is that the global financial system with its emphasis on market 
fundamentalism is inherently flawed, and this is what made the financial crisis in Europe 
possible (Kouvelakis 2012, Soros 2012).  A second argument is that the Euro itself was a bad 
idea from the beginning and was inevitably heading towards crisis (Overtveldt 2011, 
Eichengreen 2012, Ash 2012).  And a third argument is that the central economic problems were 
really centered on Greece, but that the crisis picked up momentum when a variety of other 
weaknesses rose to the surface in other member states, creating a general crisis of confidence in 
the European economy (Manolopoulos 2011).   
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The debate on the causes and consequences of the Eurozone crisis is complex, and 
beyond the scope of this article, but it is clear that once the crisis was underway, many factors 
contributed to aggravating it, such as the media, speculators, rating agencies, and so on.  The 
widespread perception that the crisis would not be confined to Greece led to a contagion effect 
and crisis of confidence, with serious financial woes spreading from Greece to Portugal, and then 
on to Spain, Italy, France, Cyprus, and others.  EU leaders chose to follow an immediate 
prescription of austerity, which backfired, adding fuel to the fire of self-fulfilling prophecy and 
negative media coverage.  Ultimately, this was a crisis of confidence above all else, but it is clear 
that the pre-existing societal tensions between northern and southern member states emerged as 
the dominant narrative during the crisis.   
Although these tensions did not cause the crisis, the crisis became an excuse to discuss 
these specific tensions openly.  Of course, at the outset, there were a variety of ways in which 
Europeans could have talked about the Greek debt crisis, and this narrative did not necessarily 
have to center on North-South tensions.  Other tensions about the crisis that arguably would have 
made much more sense in this context were: blame for US neglect in upholding financial 
regulation, anger towards Wall Street, criticism of the global banking sector for greed and 
corruption, questioning of capitalism in general, or complaining of growing inequality between 
the rich and the poor.  As with all crises, there are multiple narratives at work, but the one that 
stood out most in the media and public debate was hostility between the North and the South, 
reflecting the pre-existing tensions of the time.  As indicative of this, from 1 May to 30 
November 2011 the most common tension highlighted in the Financial Times was that of 
division between northern and southern Europe.  Only 2 per cent of the time did coverage 
mention US-EU tensions, even though this was the main cause of global economic crisis, which 
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served as an external trigger for the contagion effect that ensued within Europe (Cross and Ma 
2015).  Even tensions between Brussels and the member states or tensions within member states 
appeared far less frequently in coverage compared to North-South tensions.7 
Beyond news coverage, Europeans (except for those in the South) often talked about 
these tensions through the language of stereotypes.  Northern European were assumed to be 
‘hard-working, law-abiding people who live within their means,’ while Southern Europeans were 
‘work-shy, rule-bending, and profligate’ (Mahony 2012).  These stereotypes sharpened and 
became widespread as the dominant narrative during 2010 and 2011.  The media again played a 
major role in spreading and sharpening the stereotypes and tensions that were being openly aired 
in the public sphere through its focus on this aspect as underlying the growing problems in the 
Eurozone: 
Taxpayers of northern Europe do not want to bail out what they perceive to be profligate 
and lazy southern Europeans. Yet their elected politicians cannot contemplate the 
alternative of sovereign default because that would put the whole European banking 
system at risk (Plender 2011). 
 
Some events bordered on the absurd: 
 
European Union policymakers were bickering about the latest unhelpful proposal for 
tackling the crisis: flying the flags of states with high budget deficits at half‐mast. The 
origins of this bizarre idea lie in the northern European, Protestant notion that debts are 
sinful and demand public humiliation. Treating economics as a morality play is one 
reason the European crisis is not over (Editorial 2011). 
 
Of course, tensions between Greece and Germany were at the heart of the North-South divide: 
Some German economists argue that others in the 17-nation currency union, like Portugal 
or even Italy, might need to leave as well...Meanwhile, Germany’s attitudes draw plenty 
of publicity in Greece and other stricken euro countries, where they feed stereotypes of 
arrogant, domineering Germans and stoke the resentments that are already deeply 
straining European unity...“People believe Greeks don’t pay our taxes and we don’t want 
to work,” said Christos Manolas, a Greek businessman. “That’s a myth perpetuated by 
the Germans.” (Ewing and Alderman 2011). 
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As the crisis progressed, France and Germany clearly took the lead in trying to find a solution.  
This was a natural development given that they have the biggest Eurozone economies, and have 
been traditional leaders throughout the evolution of the EU.  In reaction to their leadership during 
the Eurozone crisis, however, many southern Europeans were highly critical, especially when it 
came to German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s role.  At various points in the crisis, the backlash 
from some southern member states became so severe that for the first time since the founding of 
the European Coal and Steel Community there was open talk of ‘the German problem’ again, 
and various other forms of highly controversial German-bashing.  Op-ed columnist Gideon 
Rachman (2012: 9) wrote, ‘Any taboos about references to the Nazi occupation of Greece have 
been dropped long ago.  Across southern Europe, the “ugly German” is back.’  Thus, Europeans 
were talking about these pre-existing tensions in far more blunt and exaggerated terms than they 
were before the crisis.  It was not that the underlying nature of these tensions was new, but that 
they had become far more intensified. 
Breaking down the North-South narrative further, media content analysis of international 
coverage of the crisis indicates that there were four main aspects to it: (1) criticism of the South 
for being fiscally irresponsible, (2) criticism of Germany for being too iron-fisted, (3) tension 
between net detractors and net contributors to the EU budget, and (4) tension between Euro and 
non-Euro member states (Cross and Ma 2015).  But when the international media frenzy 
surrounding the crisis reached its height in November 2011, the specific narrative expressed in 
the media was the problem with Germany’s behavior, more than any other.  45 per cent of the 
coverage of North-South tensions in TIME Magazine, 54 per cent in The Economist, 48 per cent 
in the International Herald Tribune, and 39 per cent in the Financial Times focused on this 
(Ibid.).  This seems to indicate a shift from blaming the South for being fiscally irresponsible to 
 16 
blaming the North for not offering its support, and in particular, blaming Germany for being too 
iron-fisted. 
This emphasis on Germany as the main problem may be somewhat surprising, given that 
the German economy itself was not suffering directly in light of the Eurozone crisis, nor were 
Germans seemingly involved in destabilizing the Euro.  But Germany – as the ‘pack leader’ of 
the northern member states – was criticized for its unwillingness to act quickly enough, for the 
austerity measures it required, and for the control from Brussels that was a condition for any 
bailout.  All of these narratives contributed to an elevated sense of North-South tensions during 
the crisis. 
 
Catharsis & Crisis Resolution 
 As the worst of the crisis began to wind down, there was growing talk among leaders of 
the greater importance of Europe for preserving peace, and enabling all European countries to 
prosper.  The overarching narrative featured less talk of the North-South divide, and started 
showing more signs of solidarity.  Leaders made explicit ties between the survival of the Euro 
and the survival of Europe, among other things.  By early 2012, the ‘end of Europe’ rhetoric had 
quickly disappeared.  As indicative of this turn towards recovery, on 3 March 2012 French 
President Nicolas Sarokzy said, ‘It is the first summit since August 2011 which has not been a 
crisis summit…It is a huge relief to see European summits dedicated to subjects other than the 
financial crisis, and a huge relief to see the financial crisis no longer dominating the headlines 
day after day’ (Peel 2012: 2). 
European leaders took a number of big steps towards fiscal integration, including: a 
European fiscal compact to maintain balanced budgets,8 transparency rules that allow Brussels to 
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monitor national budgets, a permanent European Stability Mechanism,9 the eventual creation of a 
fiscal union, and increased powers to the European Central Bank.  Some even more far-reaching 
initiatives that would have never been discussed seriously before the crisis were also put on the 
table, such as: a banking union, a financial transaction tax, a European finance minister, 
Eurobonds, a mechanism to temporarily ban speculative trading, a ban on rating agencies 
addressing sovereign debt, a European monetary fund, and an EU rating agency.  These far-
ranging initiatives show that European leaders used the crisis as an opportunity to find new areas 
of consensus.  As Germany’s finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, put it, ‘We can get things 
done that we could not do without the crisis’ (Peel and Wiesmann 2011).  Before the crisis, 
talking about these various provisions would have been impossible, in large part because of 
underlying tensions.  Even uttering the words ‘fiscal union’ would have caused deep alarm.  
Why did EU integration move forward so dramatically in the wake of such a severe 
crisis, and is catharsis part of the explanation?  Besides the fact that talk of North-South division 
has declined in the public narrative from its height during the crisis, it is also valuable to 
compare changes in North-South attitudes before (2008) and after (2013) the crisis.  One 
important indicator of this is citizens’ ‘desired scope of European policy-making’ (Vössing 
2005: 445--67).  The Spring 2008 Eurobarometer survey finds that 49 per cent of EU citizens 
thought that their own national government alone should make decisions about the economy and 
47 per cent thought that these decisions should be made jointly with the EU (Eurobarometer 
2008: 8).  Table 1 breaks this down in terms of northern versus southern member states, and 
shows that before the crisis southern member states were generally more in favor of EU 
economic integration than northern member states were.  Thus, there was a clear difference in 
northern and southern views on this issue. 
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Table 1. Desired Scope of European policy-making 2008 (Eurobarometer) 
 
 Economic 
decisions 
should be 
made at the 
national level 
Economic 
decisions should 
be made jointly 
with the EU 
Core southern member states 
Greece 54 46 
Spain 44 49 
Portugal 45 50 
Cyprus  32 65 
Italy 40 53 
Average South 43 52.6 
 
Core northern member states 
Austria 49 47 
Germany 68 29 
Finland 76 23 
Netherlands 44 55 
Average North 59.25 38.5 
 
Did this change after the crisis?  The Eurobarometer survey stopped asking exactly the 
same question, but a related question posed in Autumn 2013 is: What is the most effective level to 
tackle the crisis?  Overall, EU citizens stated that the EU is ‘best able to take effective action 
against the effects of the financial and economic crisis’ (Eurobarometer 2013: 29).  Table 2 
shows how this breaks down in terms of northern versus southern views.  The percentages appear 
low because respondents were given a list of several options beyond just national vs. EU in 
answering the question, but the significant finding is that in 2013 there is almost no difference in 
attitudes between northern and southern citizens.  This is a clear change from the answers they 
gave in 2008 to a similar question.  In short, after the worst of the crisis was over, northern and 
southern member states converged in their views on the question of whether the national or EU 
level is best at dealing with the economy, and they rank the EU first. 
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Table 2. The Most Effective Level to Tackle the Crisis 2013 (Eurobarometer Annex: 10)10  
 
 National EU 
Core southern member states 
Greece 29% 22% 
Spain 17% 23% 
Portugal 20% 23% 
Cyprus  18% 24% 
Italy 23% 22% 
Average South 21.4% 22.8% 
 
Core northern member states 
Austria 21% 24% 
Germany 21% 24% 
Finland 15% 22% 
Netherlands 19% 20% 
Average North 19% 22.5% 
 
Another important indicator of the effect of the crisis on North-South tensions is citizens’ 
‘desired content or direction of policies on the European level’ (Vössing: 2005).  Here, the data 
from different kinds of questions in the 2013 survey is even more revealing.  Table 3 shows 
evidence for the emergence of newfound common views on the content and direction of EU 
economic and financial integration. 
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Table 3.  Desired Content or Direction of Policies 2013: per cent agreement 
(Eurobarometer Annex 2013: 112--8) 
 
As a 
consequence of 
the crisis… 
 
 
member 
states should 
work 
together 
more  
member 
states will 
have to work 
more closely 
together 
the EU will be 
stronger over 
the longer 
term  
you feel closer 
to the citizens 
in other EU 
countries 
Core southern member states  
Greece 92% 88% 42% 54% 
Spain 93% 88% 61% 44% 
Portugal 91% 78% 50% 43% 
Cyprus  98% 97% 45% 60% 
Italy 82% 74% 50% 52% 
Average South 91.2% 85% 49.6% 50.6% 
 
Core northern member states 
Austria 78% 74% 46% 39% 
Germany 93% 90% 57% 43% 
Finland 92% 90% 62% 44% 
Netherlands 89% 86% 58% 28% 
Average North 88% 85% 55.75% 38.5% 
 
In terms of the desired content or direction of EU policies, the high percentage of 
agreement in response to the questions of whether member states should work or will have to 
work together more closely in the area of finance and the economy is striking.  In contrast to 
2008 – when 52.6 per cent and 28.5 per cent of citizens in southern and northern member states 
respectively thought that economic decisions should be made jointly between the member states 
and the EU – the answer to a similar question in 2013 resulted in an average of 91.2 per cent and 
88 per cent of agreement from southern and northern member states respectively that EU 
member states should work more closely together.  Beyond this extremely high level of support 
for working together more closely, these responses again indicate convergence in northern vs. 
southern attitudes. 
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The question of whether the EU will be stronger over the longer term as a result of the 
crisis garnered an optimistic response across both northern (55.75 per cent) and southern member 
states (49.6 per cent).  Given the uncertainty of the period immediately following the crisis, the 
answers to this question elicited a relatively high number of ‘don’t know,’ but it is still 
significant that the number of citizens in agreement is relatively similar across core northern and 
southern member states, despite the very different experiences of the two regions during the 
crisis.  By contrast, before the crisis in Spring 2008, the average percentage of agreement among 
citizens in southern member states to the statement that ‘things are going in the right direction’ in 
the European Union was 41.6 per cent, and 37.75 per cent for citizens in northern member states 
(Eurobarometer 2008: data).11  Thus, this was not a source of North-South tension even before 
the crisis, but the increased level of optimism about the longer-term prospects for the EU, 
combined with very high levels of support for member states working together, does indicate a 
sense of catharsis as the existential crisis wound down.  Similarly, the question of whether 
respondents feel closer to other Europeans, while somewhat vague (i.e. it does not say which 
Europeans), is helpful in indicating that the harsh narratives expressed during the height of the 
crisis are not so strongly felt post-crisis. 
Overall, comparison of related opinion polls before and after the crisis supports the idea 
that the crisis served as an opportunity to release tensions related to North-South differences in 
economic cultures.  These tensions had been intensifying before the crisis, but they were openly 
expressed during the crisis, and were weakened after the height of the crisis.  Linked to societal 
catharsis was the ability of member-state leaders to agree to new levels of economic integration 
with at least implicit public support (attitudes towards austerity were a different matter).  Indeed, 
more than half of Europeans believe that there has been an increase in the future legitimacy of 
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the EU as an economic power in world politics, and systematic studies show that more financial 
integration will likely lead to more development and growth for the EU economy.12 
 
Conclusion 
The existing literature on crisis resolution makes clear that crises are critical junctures 
that broaden the range of possible outcomes, give leaders more power to decide than they have 
normally, and in the case of international crises, enable leaders to give up on collective action, to 
freeze it, or to push forward.  Of course, elite consensus may end up exacerbating the situation 
(i.e. with austerity) or making circumstances worse (i.e. high unemployment and low growth) 
before they get better.  However, the question of why the EU seems to continually resolve crises 
with more political will to advance the European project is worth investigating.  
I suggest that an important dimension in building new areas of elite consensus after the 
Eurozone crisis was the linked and simultaneous process of catharsis that took place across 
northern and southern Eurozone countries, and the resulting convergence in societal attitudes. In 
other crisis cases, other tensions might be at stake, such as East-West, public-elite, and so on.  A 
next step is to investigate the motivations and mechanisms behind elite choices.  It is reasonable 
to assume that in a democratic environment, elites would care about public opinion, or being 
seen to contribute to a solution, but future research could confirm this.  Moreover, the question 
of why the EU is more prone to experiencing catharsis after existential crisis compared to other 
political arrangements, such as the League of Nations, could be established. 
Many scholars contend that there has actually been an intensification of North-South 
tensions in the wake of the crisis (Torreblanca and Leonard 2013: 1--6).  They typically cite the 
southern region’s plummeting trust in national governments and political parties, while northern 
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citizens’ trust in national institutions remains about the same as before the crisis (Eurobarometer 
as cited in Alonso 2013).  Or, they argue that the creditor countries in the North do not want to 
bear the debt burden of those in the South, while those in the South feel as though the EU has 
placed them in an economic ‘straightjacket’ (Torreblanca and Leonard 2013).  Much of the 
media and public commentary also focuses on the dire circumstances associated with growing 
Euroskepticism, citing declining trust overall in the EU (Rohac 2013).  The further assumption is 
that if these two trends are at work, and yet, European leaders continue with significant steps 
towards more integration, there must also be a growing democratic deficit. 
I would suggest that the premises of these two general views on the effects of the 
Eurozone crisis are somewhat flawed.  First, in terms of the claim that the North-South divide 
has grown even stronger, I have cited evidence to the contrary in this article: after the height of 
the crisis, northern and southern views have converged in support of prioritizing the EU as the 
level that should decide economic policy, and the overwhelming majority believes that EU 
members states should and must work more closely together.  In addition, if northern and 
southern member states have different levels of trust in their national-level institutions, this says 
nothing about tensions between these two regions.  It is important to note that public trust 
declined further for national-level institutions than it did for EU-level institutions over this 
period (Eurobarometer 2013: 5).  Thus, Europeans are less trusting in democratic institutions in 
general compared to before the crisis. 
Second, as Serricchio, Tsakatika, and Quaglia (2013: 52) write, there is, ‘a distinction 
between mass attitudes towards the current workings of the EU and mass attitudes towards the 
project of European integration.’  In other words, critics of the EU are not necessarily skeptical 
of the EU.  For example, Greek citizens have declining trust in the EU, but they still 
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overwhelmingly want to stay in the EU and keep the Euro (Nanou and Vernet 2013).  More 
generally, opinion polls indicate that European citizens maintained their confidence in financial 
institutions between the pre-crisis era and 2012 (Manchin 2012b).  For the most part, they have 
maintained their faith in meritocracy of the European employment sector (Manchin 2012a).  The 
November 2013 Eurobarometer (9) survey also reveals that more than half of Europeans are 
optimistic about the future of the EU, while pessimism is declining.  The same is true for support 
of the single market and common currency (24). 
 The case of the Eurozone crisis provides just one example of a general pattern likely 
present in much of the integration process, that crises result in more opportunities for consensus 
in the EU.  This article has explored why this might be the case, beyond standard accounts of 
crisis resolution.  Thus, what might appear to be episodes of failure can also be viewed as 
triggers for future success.  
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1 I refer in particular to crises that seemingly threaten the very existence of the EU (existential 
crises).  For other examples see Cross and Ma 2015; Jo 2007.  
2 Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, and Austria are generally recognized as the core group of 
northern Eurozone member states, while Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain are 
considered the core group of southern Eurozone member states.  Denmark, Sweden, and the UK 
are also representative of ‘the north,’ but as non-Euro countries they are less central to this 
analysis. 
3 Of course, various aspects of this crisis are still ongoing, but it no longer represents an 
existential crisis for Europe.   
4 These three stages may happen virtually simultaneously, but it is helpful to think of them as 
distinct processes for analytical purposes.  
5 Many scholars have correctly pointed out that beyond the financial dimension of the Eurozone 
crisis there have been implications for the institutional and constitutional dimensions.  For the 
purposes of this article, I confine my analysis to the core financial aspect of the Eurozone crisis 
and its impact on Eurozone member states. 
6 Some in the media and academia have referred to this as center-periphery tensions, with 
Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy as the periphery.  See Jabko 2012. 
7 These are English-language, and elite-oriented news media, they are highly respected, have a 
very high circulation, and represent a wide variety of views.  I use these sources simply as a good 
indication of media framing at the time. 
8 The Commission now has the authority to require spending cuts of member states, or impose 
large fines if they are found to be in violation of the rules.  The Czech Republic and UK have 
opted out, but have not ruled out eventually joining. 
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9 To replace the European Financial Stabilization Facility & European Financial Stabilization 
Mechanism in July 2012.  This 500 billion euro rescue fund can be spent without the approval of 
national parliaments.   
10 Other possible answers to this survey question included the United States, G20, IMF, 
miscellaneous, none, and don’t know. 
11 The breakdown was Greece 46%, Portugal 41%, Cyprus 47%, Spain 48%, Italy 26%, 
Germany 37%, the Netherlands 46%, Austria 27%, and Finland 41%. 
12 For example, see Guiso et al., 2004: 523--577. 
